

Part 2. Dionysus

1003

To him who is well constituted, who does my heart good, who is carved from wood which is hard, fine and fragrant – who delights even my nose – this book is dedicated.

He savours that which is wholesome.

His enjoyment of anything ceases as soon as it goes beyond the bounds of wholesomeness.

He divines the remedies for minor injuries; his illnesses are the great *stimulantia* of his life.

He knows how to take advantage of his own bad luck.

He grows stronger through the misfortunes which threaten to destroy him.

He instinctively gleans from everything he sees, hears and experiences only that which serves his main purpose; he proceeds on a principle of *selectivity*; he allows much to fall by the wayside.

He reacts with a leisureliness born of long caution and deliberate pride – he examines the stimulus to determine where it comes from, where it is going, without submitting to it.

He is always in his *own* company, whether his commerce is with books, with people or with landscapes: he honours things by choosing them, permitting them, *trusting* them . . .

1004

Having obtained a bird's-eye view of things, we begin to grasp that everything happens just as it *ought to happen* and that all manner of 'imperfections', together with all their attendant sufferings, are part of that which is *eminently desirable*.

1005

Around 1876 I was horrified to see all my previous hopes *compromised*, once I realized what Wagner was doing; and I was bound very closely to him by a profound harmony of interests, by gratitude, by his irreplaceability and by the absolute privation I saw looming before me. Around the same time it seemed to me that I was inextricably entangled in my philological research and teaching – *imprisoned* in a life born of accident and expediency – I did not know how to escape and I was weary, exhausted, spent.

Around the same time I realized that I was instinctively opposed to what Schopenhauer was doing; I was seeking a justification of life, even in its most terrible, most ambiguous and most mendacious aspects, for which I possessed the formula ‘Dionysian’. Against the idea that the ‘intrinsic nature of things’ is necessarily good, blessed, true and unitary, Schopenhauer’s interpretation of the thing-in-itself as *will* was a step in the right direction; but he did not know how to *deify* this will: he still clung to the moral-Christian ideal. Schopenhauer was still so much under the sway of Christian values that, once he could no longer regard the thing-in-itself as ‘God’, it had to be bad, stupid, utterly reprehensible. He did not realize that there can be countless many ways of being different, even countless many ways of being God.

A curse on that narrow-minded dichotomy, good versus evil.

1006

Until now moral values have been the supreme values; does anybody doubt this? . . . If we remove these values from that position, we alter all values; the principle which had previously determined their *relative rank* is thereby overthrown . . .

1007

To revalue values – what would that involve exactly? It requires the existence of all the new, prospective tendencies *which have already arisen of their own accord*, tendencies which evince strength but which continue to be called by the wrong names and subjected to the wrong assessments, tendencies which

have not yet *become aware* of themselves as such. It involves having the courage to become aware of and *affirm* everything which we have already *achieved* – and then to get out of the rut of these old value judgements which have cast aspersions on us precisely for the best and strongest things which we *have* achieved.

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A doctrine for which the necessary preparations have not been made, for which the marshalled forces and stockpiled explosives are inadequate, would be completely superfluous. A revaluation of values can only be achieved when there is a tension generated by new needs, a tension in the men who harbour these new needs, who suffer from the old assessment without being aware of it . . .

1009

The points of view for *my* values: whether out of abundance or longing . . . whether looking on, or lending a hand . . . or looking away and stepping aside . . . whether the pent-up energy is also released ‘spontaneously’ or is only *reactively* stimulated or provoked, whether one is *simple* out of a paucity of elements, or out of such an overwhelming command over a multiplicity of them that one can press them into service as needed . . . whether one is a *problem* or a *solution* . . . whether one is perfect with a small task, or imperfect with an extraordinary aim . . . whether one is *genuine* or only an *actor*, whether one is a genuine actor or only the bad copy of an actor, whether one is a ‘representative’ or the thing represented – whether one is a ‘personage’ or merely a rendezvous of various people . . . whether one is *ill* from a disease or from an *excess* of health . . . whether one goes on ahead as a shepherd, or as an ‘exception’ (or, for a third species, as a fugitive) . . . whether one has need of *dignity* – or of ‘the buffoon’? Whether one seeks resistance or evades it? Whether one is imperfect by being ‘too early’ or ‘too late’ . . . whether one’s nature is affirmative or negative or a peacock’s tail of many different colours? Whether one is proud enough to be unashamed even of one’s own vanity? Whether

one is still able to feel the bite of conscience? (This *species* is becoming rarer; formerly conscience had too much to gnaw on, but now it seems as if it no longer has enough teeth to do so.) Whether one is still able to have a sense of 'duty'. (There are those who would be deprived of what little lust for life remains if they allowed themselves to be *robbed* of 'duty', especially the little women and the humbly born.)

1010

Suppose that our usual way of regarding the world were a *misunderstanding*: could a new kind of *perfection* be conceived within whose limits even such *misunderstandings* would be *sanctioned*?

My idea is that those things which do *not* accord with our sense of logic, 'beauty', 'goodness' or 'truth' might well be perfect in a higher sense than our ideal itself is.

1011

We have largely confined ourselves to what we know and have refused to make an idol out of what we do not; after many false starts and much wasted effort, we have scarcely begun to know anything.

And yet, we have discovered a 'New World'; we have been compelled to acknowledge *the extent to which we are the authors of our own sense of what is valuable and what is not* – and therefore *able* to assign a meaning to history.

The logical outcome of our belief in truth, as you know, is that if there is anything to worship, it is illusion that must be worshipped; for is it not the lie, and *not* the truth, which is . . . divine?

1012

Whatever advances rationality, likewise lends renewed strength to its antagonists: mysticism and folly of every kind.

We should recognize that *every movement* is:

- (1) *partly* weariness with a previous movement (satiety with it, feeble spite towards it, illness), and
- (2) *partly* a newly awakened, long-dormant, pent-up energy, joyous, exuberant, violent health.

1013

Healthiness and sickliness: but here we have to be careful! The standard remains physical efflorescence, intellectual agility, courage and cheerfulness – but also, of course, *how much sickness one can put up with and overcome* – how much of it one can *transform* into health. The very things which would ruin a man of more delicate constitution are among the things which stimulate *great* health.

1014

It is only a matter of strength: one must have all the pathological traits of the century, but offset by the superabundant strength necessary to recuperate from them, to sculpt them into something more. *The strong man*: a sketch.

1015

Concerning the strength of the nineteenth century. We are *more medieval* than the eighteenth century; not merely more curious about or more excited by the strange and the rare. We are in revolt against the French Revolution . . .

We have freed ourselves from the *fear of reason*, which was the spectre of the eighteenth century; we again dare to be absurd, lyrical and childish . . . in a word, ‘we are musicians’. We are no more *frightened* of the *ridiculous* than we are of the *absurd*. The *Devil* finds that tolerance of God works in his favour; more than that, he has an interest as one who has been misunderstood and slandered from time immemorial – we are defenders of the *Devil’s* honour. We no longer separate the great from the terrible. We account the *good* things, in all their complexity, together with the *worst* things; we have overcome the aspiration of the past (which was to have the growth of goodness without the growth of wickedness). *Cowardice* in the face of the Renaissance ideal has subsided – we dare to aspire to *Renaissance morality* itself. At the same time, intolerance towards the priests and the Church has come to an end; ‘belief in God is immoral’, but precisely that is what we regard as its best possible justification.

We have given all these things their *due*. We are not afraid of the *obverse* of ‘good things’, e.g. Greek antiquity, morality,

reason, good taste: we *seek them out*, being brave and curious enough to do so. We have recalculated the losses which all these treasures incur; such a treasure is *almost enough to reduce one to poverty*. Nor do we conceal from ourselves the obverse of 'bad things' either . . .

1016

On modernity; that which does us honour. If anything does us honour, it is our conviction that the things which are to be taken *seriously* lie elsewhere: *humble* things, things which are perpetually despised and neglected, we regard as important; 'fine sentiments', on the other hand, we hold cheap . . . Is there a more dangerous aberration than contempt for the body? Was not the entire realm of the intellect thereby condemned to become morbid, condemned to the *vapeurs* of 'idealism'?

Nothing devised by Christians and idealists makes any sense; we are more radical. We have discovered that the 'smallest world' is usually the decisive one; we are, in a dangerous manner, in the . . .

We know the value of well-paved streets, fresh air in our rooms, clean lodgings, wholesome food; we take all the *necessities* of life seriously and *despise* everything that smacks of the 'beautiful soul' as [a] kind of 'levity and frivolity'. That which has been previously most despised now takes precedence. To that I add immorality: morality is only a form of immorality, which, with regard to the advantage which a certain kind has therefrom . . .

1017

In the place of Rousseau's 'man of Nature', we in the nineteenth century have discovered a much truer image of 'man' – having had the courage to do so . . . On the whole, the Christian notion 'man' has thereby been re-established. What we have not had the courage to do was to approve of this 'man in himself' and to see in him the guarantor of man's future. Similarly, we refuse to see that the further development of man's formidableness is a concomitant of the further development of culture; in this respect we are still subservient to the Christian ideal, and

side with it against paganism as well as against the Renaissance notion of *virtù*. But this is not the key to culture; and *in praxi*, historical fabrications persist which redound to the benefit of the 'good man' (as if he alone represented human progress), as does the Socialist ideal (i.e. the residue of Christianity and of Rousseau in the de-Christianized world).

We have been struggling against the influence of the eighteenth century; it was Goethe and Napoleon who surmounted it more than any others. Even Schopenhauer struggled against it, but inadvertently found himself returning to the seventeenth – he is a modern Pascal, with Pascalian value judgements *sans* Christianity . . . Schopenhauer was not strong enough for a new affirmation.

With *Napoleon* we begin to comprehend that the superior and the formidable man form a necessary unity. The 'male' is restored; woman once again receives the contempt and fear she deserves. 'Totality' as health and highest activity; the straight line, the grand style in action rediscovered; the most powerful instinct of life itself, ambition, is affirmed.

1018

(*Revue des deux mondes*, 15 February 1887. Taine.)

'Suddenly the *faculté maîtresse*³⁶ reveals itself; the *artist*, which was enclosed within the politician, is drawn *de sa gaine*;³⁷ he creates *dans l'idéal et l'impossible*.³⁸ He is once more recognized for what he is: the posthumous brother of Dante and of Michelangelo; and indeed, in the clear outlines of his vision, the intensity, the coherence and inner logic of his dream, the depth of his meditation, the superhuman grandeur of his conception, he is thus their like *et leur égal: son génie a la même taille et la même structure; il est un de trois esprits souverains de la renaissance italienne*.³⁹

Nota bene . . .

Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon –

1019

Religion. In the inward economy of the *primitive* man's psyche, the *fear of evil* prevails. What is *evil*? Three things: the

accidental, the indeterminate and the unexpected. How does primitive man combat evil? He conceives of it as something rational, powerful, even personal. Thus he is able to enter into agreements with it and even to influence it in advance – to prevent it. Another expedient is to maintain that its wickedness and harmfulness are merely illusory; he regards the consequences of the accidental, of the indeterminate, of the unexpected as *well intentioned*, as meaningful . . . And above all, he interprets misfortune as ‘deserved’; he justifies evil as punishment . . . *In summa, he submits to it*: the whole interpretation of evil in moral and religious terms is nothing but a form of submission to it. The belief that there is some good purpose to evil means relinquishing the struggle against it.

Now, the entire history of civilization represents a decreasing *fear of the accidental*, of the uncertain and of the unexpected. Being civilized means precisely learning to *calculate*, learning to think in terms of causes, learning how to prevent evils, learning to believe in necessity. With the growth of civilization, man is able to dispense with that *primitive* form of submission to suffering known as religion or morality and is able to dispense with that ‘justification of suffering’. Now he wages war against suffering – he abolishes it. There is even a possible condition in which man becomes weary with his own sense of security, with his own belief in law and predictability – in which *an inclination towards the accidental, the indeterminate and the unexpected* becomes thrilling . . .

Let us pause for a moment to consider this symptom of the *highest culture*; I call it the *pessimism of strength*. Man *no longer* needs a ‘justification of suffering’; ‘justification’ is precisely what he finds abhorrent; he enjoys suffering *pur, cru*;⁴⁰ he regards *senseless suffering* as the most interesting kind. If he had need of a god in the past, he now delights in a disordered world without God, a world of accident, a world in which terror, ambiguity and seduction are essential.

In such a condition, it is precisely *goodness* which stands in need of ‘justification’, i.e. it must have its foundation in something evil and dangerous, or else involve some great stupidity; *then it still pleases us*. Animality no longer horrifies us; a witty

and cheerful exuberance in favour of the animal in man is, in such times, the most triumphant form of intellectuality. Man is now strong enough to be ashamed of *believing in God* – he now may play *advocatus diaboli* all over again. If *in praxi* he supports the preservation of virtue, he does so for those reasons which reveal that virtue involves subtlety, cunning, that it is a form of covetousness and ambition.

Even this *pessimism of strength* culminates in a *theodicy*, i.e. in an absolute affirmation of the world, but for those reasons which formerly led to its denial: and in this way, to a conception of this world as the actually *achieved ideal*, as the *highest ideal imaginable*.

1020

The main types of pessimism:

The pessimism of *sensitivity* (excessive irritability with a preponderance of the feelings of displeasure).

The pessimism of the '*unfree will*' (in other words, lack of inhibition, an inability to resist stimuli).

The pessimism of *doubt* (a hesitancy in the face of anything solid and substantial, or comprehensible and tangible).

The corresponding psychological conditions may all be observed in the madhouse, albeit with a certain degree of exaggeration. Likewise 'nihilism' (the penetrating sense of 'nothingness').

But how are we to classify:

Pascal's *moral pessimism*?

The *metaphysical pessimism* of the Vedanta philosophy?

The *social pessimism* of the anarchists (or Shelley's)?

The pessimism of *compassion* (that of Tolstoy, A. de Vigny)?

Are all these things not also phenomena indicating disease and decay? . . . Attaching excessive importance to moral values, or to 'otherworldly' fictions, or to social calamities, or to *suffering* in general: any such *exaggeration* of a *particular point of view* is already a sign of disease. Also the preponderance of negation over affirmation!

However, *we must not confound any of this* with the passion for denial and destruction characteristic of all rich and powerful men and ages, a passion which arises from the immense strength and energy with which they *affirm*. This passion is, if you will, a luxury, as well as a form of courage which confronts everything formidable, a sympathy for everything terrible and questionable; because, among other things, one is terrible and questionable oneself: the *Dionysian* in will, intellect, taste.

IO2I

My Five 'No's

- (1) My struggle against the *sense of guilt* and the introduction of the notion of *punishment* into the physical and metaphysical world, likewise into psychology and the interpretation of history. The insight into the manner in which every philosophy and value judgement hitherto has *brought morality into everything*.
- (2) My recognition and exposure of the *traditional* ideal, of the Christian ideal, even where the dogmatic form of Christianity lies in ruins. *The danger of the Christian ideal* lies in its sense of what is valuable; it can dispense with its doctrinal expression; my struggle against *latent Christianity* (e.g. in music, in Socialism).
- (3) My struggle against the eighteenth century (as embodied in *Rousseau*), against its 'Nature', its 'good man', its belief in the reign of sentiment – against the pampering, weakening and moralizing of man; it is an ideal born of *hatred for aristocratic culture*, which *in praxi* is the reign of unbridled resentment, an ideal devised as a standard to rally around in a struggle against one's betters – the Christian morality of guilt; the morality of resentment (posturing by the mob).
- (4) My struggle against *Romanticism*, in which the ideals of Christianity and of Rousseau are combined, but which possesses at the same time a hankering for *olden times* of priestly and aristocratic culture, [for] *virtù*, for the 'strong man' – something utterly hybrid, the notion of a *stronger* mankind which is ultimately false, an imitation; Romanticism, which holds extreme conditions in general

in high esteem and sees in them a symptom of strength (the 'cult of passion') – the desire for strong men, extreme conditions – an imitation of the most expressive forms, a *furore espressivo* born *not* out of abundance but out of *want* (among poets, e.g. Stifter and G. Keller give signs of more strength and inner wellbeing than . . .).⁴¹

- (5) My struggle against the *ascendancy of gregarious instincts*, now that science has made common cause with them; against the renewed hatred with which every kind of hierarchy and superiority is treated.

Engineering, cheerful music, etc. are born out of relative abundance and are pursued with pleasure. Great feats of engineering and invention, the natural sciences, possibly history, all are products of the relative strength and self-confidence of the nineteenth century.

IO22

From the pressure of superabundance, from the excitement of energies which are continually growing within us and which we do not yet know how to discharge, a condition arises like that which precedes a thunderstorm; our own nature *darkens*. That, too, is pessimism . . . A doctrine which puts an end to such a condition by *commanding* something, a revaluation of values by virtue of which the accumulated energies are shown a way, a whereto, so that they explode into action and flashes of lightning – such a doctrine by no means needs to *teach* happiness; for by releasing pent-up energy which was compressed to an agonizing degree, *it brings happiness*.

IO23

Pleasure arises from power. Happiness consists in the dominant, dawning consciousness of power and triumph. Progress: the strengthening of the type, the capacity for great willing; everything else is misunderstanding, danger . . .

IO24

We have entered a period where the old masquerade, in which the emotions were festooned with moral significance, now

excites disgust: we would sooner have *naked nature*, where the *amounts of power* are simply admitted to be *decisive* (in *determining rank*) and where, as a consequence of *grand passion*, the *grand style* returns.

1025

The task of culture is to *press into service* everything formidable, individually, gradually and tentatively; but until it is *strong enough* to do so it must combat, moderate, conceal and even curse these things.

Wherever a culture regards something as *evil*, it is an expression of *fear* and therefore of *weakness* . . .

Thesis: everything good is a former evil which has been rendered serviceable.

Standard: the greater and more formidable the passions which an age, a people or an individual allow themselves, because they are able to use them *as a means*, the *higher their culture is* (the realm of evil is becoming ever *smaller* . . .).

The more mediocre, weak, servile and cowardly a man is, the more things he will regard as *evil*: according to him the realm of evil is the most extensive. The most inferior man sees the realm of evil (i.e. that which is forbidden to him and hostile to him) everywhere.

1026

It is not a fact that 'happiness follows virtue' – rather, it is the more powerful man who *first* declares his happy state to *be* virtue.

Evil actions are characteristic of the mighty and the virtuous: vicious actions are associated with the subjugated.

The mightiest man would have to be the most evil, in as much as he makes his ideal prevail over all men in *opposition* to their ideals and fashions them according to his own image – the creator.

Evil, in this respect, means hard, painful, oppressive.

Men such as Napoleon must come again and again, thereby confirming afresh our belief in the autonomy of the individual: he himself, however, was corrupted by the means he *had* to stoop to and thus *lost noblesse* of character. If his foes had been different

sorts of men, he could have availed himself of other means and thus it would not seem *necessary* that a Caesar *become bad*.

1027

Man is both *beast* and *super-beast*; the superior man is both subhuman and superhuman: these two belong together. With man's every ascent into the heights of greatness, he also descends into the depths of cruelty; we should not desire the one without the other – or rather, the more thoroughly we desire the one, the more thoroughly we attain the other.

1028

Formidableness is a part of greatness; let us not deceive ourselves.

1029

I have presented such terrifying images of knowledge that any 'Epicurean delight' is thereby rendered impossible. Only Dionysian rapture *suffices* – *I was the first to discover the tragic*. The Greeks misunderstood it, thanks to their sententiousness and superficiality. Also, resignation is *not* the lesson tragedy teaches – but rather a misunderstanding of it! The longing for nothingness is the *denial* of tragic wisdom, its opposite!

1030

Rich and powerful souls not only manage to deal with painful, even terrible losses, hardships, robberies and insults; they emerge from such hells with an even greater richness and power, and – the most essential thing – with a newly developed sense of the rapture of love. I believe that he who has divined something of the most fundamental conditions for the growth of love will [understand] Dante for having written over the portal of his *inferno*: 'Even I was created by eternal love.'⁴²

1031

To have traversed the entire circumference of the modern soul and to have occupied every point thereon – that is my ambition, my torture, my happiness.

To have really *overcome* pessimism – and as a result to have acquired the eyes of a Goethe, filled with love and goodwill.

1032

The first question is by no means whether we are satisfied with ourselves, but whether we are satisfied with anything at all. Suppose that we said yes to a single moment, then we have not only said yes to ourselves, but to the whole of existence. For nothing stands alone, either in ourselves or in things; and if our soul did but once vibrate and resound with a chord of happiness, then all of eternity was necessary to bring forth this one occurrence – and in this single moment when we said yes, all of eternity was embraced, redeemed, justified and affirmed.

1033

The *affirmative* emotions.

Pride.

Joy.

Health.

Love between the sexes.

Enmity and war.

Reverence.

Beautiful gestures, manners and objects.

Strong will.

The discipline of high intellectuality.

The will to power.

Gratitude to the earth and to life.

In short, all that is rich and munificent, that bestows, gilds, immortalizes and deifies life – the whole sway of the *transfiguring* virtues . . . everything that gives countenance, that affirms in word, that affirms in deed.

1034

We few or many who again dare to live in a world *from which all moral meaning has fled*, we pagans in faith, are probably also the first to understand what a pagan faith actually involves: the obligation to imagine not just *beings which are superior* to

man, but beings which are beyond good and evil; the obligation to regard everything which is superior as immoral. We believe in Olympus – and *not* in the ‘Crucified’.

1035

More recently, man has exercised his capacity for idealization with respect to *gods* mostly by the increasing *moralization of them* – but what does that mean? Nothing good, a diminution in man’s strength –

That said, there is nothing inherently impossible about doing the reverse and there are some indications that this is being done. Such a god could be thought of as being emancipated from morality, as gathering into himself the *whole* plenitude of life’s contradictions, *redeeming and justifying* them in a divine agony – God as above and beyond the wretched loiterers’ morality of ‘good and evil’.

1036

NB. The world with which we are acquainted does not permit us to *demonstrate* the existence of a humanitarian God; nowadays we can force you to admit as much – but what conclusion do you draw from that? He is not demonstrable to us; that is epistemological scepticism. But the conclusion which you all fear is, ‘from the world with which we are acquainted quite a different God would be demonstrable, one who is not humanitarian in the least’ . . . i.e. you cleave fast to your God and invent for Him a world with which *we are not acquainted*.

1037

Let us banish the highest good from our notion of God: it is unworthy of a god. Let us likewise banish the highest wisdom: philosophers’ vanity is responsible for this absurd notion that God is a monster of wisdom, that He should look as much as possible like them . . . No! God as *the supreme power* – that is sufficient! Everything – even the ‘world!’ – follows from that *symbolice*, that we might have a distinctive mark by which *dominus omnipotens* may be recognized.

1038

From 'On the history of the concept of God'. And how many new gods are still possible! . . . I myself, in whom the religious, that is, the god-making instinct sometimes wishes to come to life again: how differently, how diversely, the divine has revealed itself to me each time! . . . So many strange things have passed before me in those timeless moments, which fell as if from the moon into my life, moments in which I no longer knew how old I already was or how young I might yet become! . . . I would not doubt that there are many kinds of gods . . . There is no lack of gods who possess even a certain undeniable Halcyonism and blitheness . . . Perhaps even light feet belong to the notion of a god. Is it necessary to explain that a god knows how to remain at all times beyond everything rational and respectable? Even, I might add, beyond good and evil? His outlook is *free* – as Goethe would say.⁴³ And to invoke the inestimable authority of Zarathustra: Zarathustra goes as far as to confess, 'I would only believe in a god who knew how to *dance* . . .' To say it again: how many new gods are still possible! Admittedly, Zarathustra himself is merely an old atheist. Understand him well! For while it is true that Zarathustra says that he *would* – Zarathustra *will* not . . .

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The divine type modelled on the type of the creative intellect, of the 'great man'.⁴⁴

1039

Art. Preface.

For me, talking about art is incompatible with a sullen deportment: I want to talk about it in the same way that I talk to myself on wild and lonely walks, where I sometimes catch sight of a sacrilegious happiness and ideal on a serene horizon. To spend one's life amid delicate and absurd things; a stranger to reality; half artist, half bird and metaphysician; without regard for reality other than to occasionally acknowledge it as good dancers do, with the tips of their toes; always tickled by any sunbeam of happiness; ebullient and encouraged even by sorrow – for sorrow *preserves* the fortunate; pinning a little tail of buffoonery

to even the holiest of things. This, it goes without saying, is the ideal of a heavy, hundredweight spirit – a *spirit of gravity* . . .

1040

*From the military academy of the soul.*⁴⁵

Dedicated to the brave, the cheerful, the austere.

I do not wish to underestimate the importance of the amiable virtues, but greatness of soul is not compatible with them.

Even in the arts, the grand style excludes what is pleasing.

~

In times of strain and vulnerability, choose war: it toughens, it develops muscles.

~

The deeply wounded have their Olympian laughter; a man only has what he needs to have.

~

It has gone on for ten years now: no sound *reaches* me any more – a land without rain. A man must have humanity to spare in order to not languish in such a *drought*.

~

Every *faith* is instinctively dishonest; it defends itself against every truth which threatens its conviction that it already possesses the ‘truth’ – it shuts its eyes, it resorts to slander . . .

~

We have a faith because it ‘makes us blessed’; we do not consider something true if it does not ‘make us blessed’.

A pudendum.

1041

How I recognize my equals. Philosophy, as I have thus far understood it and lived it, is the voluntary exploration of even the accursed and odious aspects of existence. From my long experience of wandering through ice and desert, I learned to view previous philosophizing quite differently – the *hidden* history of the philosophers, the psychology of its great names, was revealed to me. ‘How much truth can an intellect *stand*; how much truth does an intellect *dare*?’ – this for me became the actual measure of value. Error is *cowardice* . . . and every

attainment of knowledge is the *result* of intellectual courage, rigour and scrupulousness . . . Such a discipline knows in advance, on a trial basis, the possibilities of even the most thoroughgoing nihilism, without implying that it would stop at a 'no', at the will to 'no'. On the contrary, it wants the very opposite, a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without deduction, exception or selection; it wants the eternal cycle: the same things, the same logical or illogical connections. The supreme condition a philosopher can attain is a Dionysian attitude towards life; my formula for this is *amor fati* . . .

This discipline includes understanding that the previously negated aspects of existence are not only necessary, but desirable; and not only desirable in terms of the previously affirmed aspects (perhaps as their concomitants or preconditions), but for their own sake, as the more powerful, more fruitful, *truer* aspects of existence in which its will expresses itself most clearly. It likewise includes deprecating the aspects of existence which were previously affirmed to the exclusion of all others. It includes understanding from where this previous assessment originates and how little a Dionysian evaluation of life is bound by it; I identified and understood *what* it was that was actually saying 'yes' here (in the first instance, the instinct of the suffering; in the second, the instinct of the gregarious and in the third, the *instinct of the majority* in their conflict with the exceptions). Thus I surmised that another, stronger kind of man would inevitably approach the elevation and improvement of man from another perspective; he would regard these *superior creatures* as being beyond good and evil, as beyond those values whose origin lies within the sphere of [the] suffering, the gregarious and the majority – I have sought the beginnings of this contrary ideal's formation in history (in the newly discovered and expounded notions 'pagan', 'classical' and 'noble').

1042

The synthesis of oppositions and opposing impulses in a people is a sign of their total strength: *how much* of this can they *subdue*?

But now we see a new conception of holiness (which was ultimately attributable to Plato's naïveté); the opposition of heretical impulses to each other is no longer in the foreground. This demonstrates the extent to which the Greek religion was *superior* to the Judeo-Christian. The latter triumphed because the Greek religion had itself degenerated (*had regressed*).

The aim should be the sanctification of the most powerful, most terrible, most disreputable forces; to use an old figure of speech, the deification of the Devil.

I043

It should come as no surprise that a couple of millennia were needed to re-establish a connection with the past – what are a couple of millennia!

I044

There must be those who consecrate *all* that we do, not only eating and drinking; and not only in remembrance of them, or to become one with them,⁴⁶ but that this world might be made *ever anew and in ever new ways* transfigured.

I045

The most intellectual men feel the charm and magic of sensual things in a way in which other men, whose hearts are set on 'things of the flesh', neither can nor should imagine – the former are sensualists in the best sense of the word, because they allow a more fundamental value to the senses than those fine sieves, those apparatuses of rarefaction and reduction, or however else one might characterize what is popularly called the 'intellect'. The strength and power of the senses – this is the most essential thing in a well-constituted and whole man: the splendid beast must be there first – otherwise to what purpose is all 'humanization'!

I046

- (1) We want to have faith in the senses, to adhere to what they tell us – and to work out the implications of all we learn

from them! The absurdity of previous philosophers in this regard is mankind at its most absurd.

- (2) The world available to us, the world that all earthly living things have constructed to appear substantial and *gradually* changing, is a world we want to *continue* to construct – not to regard as false or argue away!
- (3) Our value judgements construct it by emphasis and accentuation. What does it mean when a whole religion says: ‘it is entirely bad and false and evil!’ This condemnation of the whole process can only be the judgement of the ill-constituted!
- (4) Of course, might it not be that they suffer the most and therefore are the most refined? That contented people are of little worth?
- (5) The artistic phenomenon known as life must be understood as *the constructive spirit*, which constructs under the most unfavourable circumstances in the most gradual way . . . the *proof* that all the world’s combinations must be given anew is that it is still here, that *it has been preserved*.

1047

Sexuality, ambition, the pleasure derived from illusion and deception, great, joyous gratitude towards life and its typical conditions – that is what is essential to pagan cults and has a good conscience on its side. That which is *unnatural* (already apparent in Greek antiquity) combats paganism, as morality, dialectics and asceticism.

1048

An anti-metaphysical view of the world – yes, but an artistic one. A pessimistic, Buddhist view of the world, a sceptical, rigorous view of the world – but *not* a positivistic one.⁴⁷

1049

The illusion of *Apollo*: the *eternity* of the beautiful form; the aristocratic legislation ‘*thus shall it ever be!*’

Dionysus: sensuality and cruelty. Transience could be interpreted as the enjoyment of procreative and destructive energies, as continual creation.

1050

The contrary movement: art – The Birth of Tragedy

According to Nietzsche,⁴⁸ these two artistic forces of nature are opposed to each other as the Dionysian and the Apollonian; he asserts that . . .

The word 'Dionysian' expresses: an urge towards unity as the abyss of oblivion, a longing to reach beyond personality, the ordinary, society, reality; a passionately painful overflow into darker, fuller, more open states; an ecstatic affirmation of the general character of life, as that which remains the same amid all change, the same in power, the same in beatitude; the great pantheistic sharing of gladness and sorrow which endorses and sanctifies even the most terrible and questionable qualities of existence out of an eternal will to procreation, to fertility, to eternity: as a sense of unity born of the necessity of creation and destruction The word 'Apollonian' expresses: the impulse towards perfect self-sufficiency, towards the typical 'individual', towards everything which simplifies and emphasizes, everything which makes a thing strong, clear, unambiguous and typical: freedom under law . . .

The further development of art is just as dependent upon their antagonism as the further development of mankind is dependent upon the antagonism between the sexes. The wealth of power and restraint, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool, noble, austere beauty: the Apollonianism of the Hellenic will.

The origin of tragedy and comedy may be regarded as a *palpable vision* of a divine type in a state of total ecstasy, as a witnessing of the legendary scene, of the visitation, miracle, act of foundation, of 'drama'.

This dichotomy of the Dionysian and of the Apollonian in the Greek soul is one of the great enigmas by which Nietzsche is drawn in considering the essence of the Hellenic. At bottom, Nietzsche endeavours to ascertain precisely why

Greek Apollinianism had to spring from Dionysian soil; the Dionysian Greek had to become Apollonian, that is, he had to break himself of the will to the monstrous, the multifarious, the indeterminate and the horrible and replace it with a will to moderation, simplicity and subordination to rules and concepts. The immoderate, the chaotic, the Asiatic, lie at the basis of the Greek character. The bravery of the Greek consists in his struggle with his Asiaticism; his beauty was not a gift, any more than the logic or the naturalness of his customs were – it was won by conquest, determination and struggle – it is his *victory* . . .

1051

It is only fair that the highest and most illustrious human joys, those in which existence celebrates its own transfiguration, should come only to the incomparable and the best constituted, although only after they and their ancestors have, unbeknownst to themselves, spent their lives in preparation for them. It is then that a superabundance of the most diverse forces and at the same time a swift power of 'free' decision and magisterial decree can amicably coexist in the same man, for then the intellect is just as much at home in the senses as the senses are at home in the intellect; and all that takes place in the one also awakens a refined and exceptionally felicitous play in the other. And conversely! Take a moment to consider this converse process in Hâfez; even Goethe gives us an inkling of this process, albeit in an attenuated form. It is probable that in such perfectly well-constituted men, enjoyments of a wholly sensual nature are ultimately transfigured into allegorical reveries of the highest intellectuality; they experience in themselves a kind of *deification of the body* and are at the greatest remove from that ascetic philosophy which is expressed in the proposition 'God is a spirit': which only goes to show that the ascetic is the 'ill-constituted man', the man who merely takes something intrinsic to him and especially that in him which judges and condemns and calls it *good* – calls it 'God'. By contrast, the Greeks knew of a whole vast spectrum of *happiness*, from that height of joy where man thoroughly feels himself to be a deified

form and self-justification of nature, all the way down to the joy of robust peasants and robust half-human animals. In the face of this, they quivered with the gratitude of the initiate and gave it, with much circumspection and pious reticence, the divine name of Dionysus. What then do modern men, the children of a frail, often ailing and unlikely mother, *know* of the *extent* of the Greeks' happiness? What *could* they know about it! What could possibly entitle the slaves of 'modern ideas' to participate in Dionysian revels!

When the Greek body and soul were 'flourishing', rather than languishing in mania and madness, there arose that mysterious symbol of the highest affirmation of the world and transfiguration of life ever attained on earth. This provides a *standard* according to which everything that has grown up since must be deemed too stunted, too impoverished, too inhibited – we need only utter the word 'Dionysus' before the best modernity has to offer, before such names as Goethe, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or Raphael, and suddenly we feel that our best things and moments have been *judged* and found wanting. Dionysus is a *judge*! Do you understand me? There can be no doubt that the Greeks drew upon their Dionysian experiences to interpret the ultimate mysteries 'concerning the fate of the soul' and everything they knew about education and refinement and, above all, about the immutable hierarchy and inequality among men; and yet without access to these experiences everything Greek is buried in a great and profound silence – *we do not know the Greeks* as long as this secret subterranean passage into their world is still obstructed. The prying eyes of scholars will never bring to light some of these things, however much scholarship remains to be done in the service of that excavation – even the noble enthusiasm of such lovers of antiquity as Goethe and Winckelmann has something improper and almost presumptuous about it. But he who waits and prepares himself; who awaits the welling-up of new springs; who prepares himself in solitude for strange visions and voices; who purifies his soul more and more of the fairground dust and noise of this age; who not only dismisses everything Christian, but who *overcomes* it by something heretical and supra-Christian⁴⁹ – for

it was the Christian doctrine that was the heresy set in opposition to the Dionysian; who rediscovers the *South* in himself and spreads above himself the canopy of a clear, brilliant and mysterious Southern sky; who recaptures his soul's Southern vigour and latent power; who becomes, step by step, more comprehensive, more supra-national, more European, more supra-European, more Oriental and ultimately more *Greek* – for the Greeks were the first to consolidate and synthesize everything Oriental and, in so doing, *inaugurated* the European soul and discovered *our* 'new world' – he who lives in obedience to such imperative demands, who knows what *he* might encounter one day? Perhaps even – a *new day!*

1052

The contrary movement: religion
The two types: Dionysus and the Crucified

Note the typically *religious* man – a form of *décadence*? The great innovators are, one and all, morbid and epileptic; but are we not leaving out the religious man who is *pagan*? Is the pagan cult not a form of thanksgiving and affirmation of life? Must not its supreme representative itself be a defence and deification of life? The type of spirit which is fully formed and rapturously overflowing . . . the type of action which incorporates and *redeems* everything in existence which is contradictory and questionable?

It is here that I situate the *Dionysus* of the Greeks: the religious affirmation of life, life in all its fullness, not life divided and disowned; it is typical that the sexual act awakens profound emotion, mystery and awe.

Dionysus versus the 'Crucified'; there you have the contrast. It is *not* that their respective martyrdoms differ – but that each one has a different *meaning*. Life itself, life's eternal fruitfulness and recurrence requires agony, destruction and the will to annihilation . . . In the other case, the suffering of the 'innocent man crucified' constitutes an objection to this life, a formula for its condemnation. As one might have gathered, the problem is the meaning of suffering; whether it is to be given a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning . . . In the first case it is the way to

a blessed existence; in the latter, *existence is sufficiently blessed* already to justify an immense amount of suffering. The tragic man affirms even the bitterest suffering; he is strong enough, rich enough, deifier enough, to do so; the Christian denies even the happiest lot on earth; he is weak enough, poor enough, disinherited enough to suffer life in any form. 'God on the cross' is a curse upon life, an indication that one should be delivered from it; Dionysus cut into pieces is a *promise* to life: that it will be eternally born anew, that it will return from its destruction.

Part 3. The Eternal Recurrence

1053

My philosophy introduces the triumphant idea which will ultimately destroy all other ways of thinking. It is the great *cultivating* idea: the races unable to bear it are doomed; the races which consider it the greatest blessing are destined to rule.

1054

For the fourth book. For this greatest of all battles, a new *weapon* is required. This hammer forces a terrible decision on Europe, confronting it with *consequences*, asking it if it is bent on its own destruction. Mediocrity must be avoided. Far better to perish!

1055

Under certain circumstances, a pessimistic way of thinking and doctrine, an ecstatic nihilism, may be essential, particularly for the philosopher: as the mighty press and hammer with which he smashes and disposes of degenerate and dying races, [in order] to make way for a new order of life, or in order to inspire a longing for the end in what was going to degenerate and die anyway.

1056

I want to teach the idea which gives the many a right to expunge themselves – the great cultivating idea.

1057

Eternal Recurrence. A book of prophecy.

- (1) The exposition of the doctrine and its theoretical presuppositions and corollaries.

- (2) The proof of the doctrine.
- (3) Presumed consequences of its being *believed* (it brings everything to the *breaking point*).
 - (a) The means of enduring them.
 - (b) The means of remedying them.
- (4) Its place in history as a *turning point*.

The time of greatest danger. The establishment of an oligarchy *above* peoples and their interests: education for a universal politics. *Counterpart of Jesuitism.*

1058

The two greatest philosophical points of view (discovered by Germans), that of *becoming*, of *development*, and that which concerns itself with the *value* of *existence* (but the wretched form of German pessimism must first be overcome!), are reconciled by me in a *decisive* manner. Everything becomes and eternally recurs – *escape* is *impossible!* Suppose that we *could* judge the value of existence, what would follow from that? The thought of recurrence is a principle of *selection* in the service of *power* (and barbarity!!). Man is *mature enough* for *this* thought.

1059

- (1) The presuppositions of the thought – what must be true for it to be true, and what it entails in turn.
- (2) The thought as the most *serious* thought: its probable effect unless it is prevented, i.e. unless we revalue all of our values.
- (3) The means of *bearing* it: the revaluation of all values: instead of the desire for certainty, a delight in uncertainty; instead of the idea ‘cause and effect’, the idea of a perpetually creative activity; instead of the will to life, the will to power, etc. Instead of the humble phrase ‘it is all *merely* subjective’, let us say, ‘it is also *our* work!’ Let us be proud of it!

1060

To *bear* the thought of recurrence, we need freedom from morality and new methods of dealing with *pain* (pain regarded

as the instrument, as the father of pleasure – there is no *cumulative* consciousness of suffering). We need to find *enjoyment* in being uncertain and experimental in all sorts of ways, to counterbalance an extreme fatalism. We must rid ourselves of the notion that things are *necessary*, that there are ‘wills’, that there is any such thing as ‘knowledge-in-itself’.

The greatest elevation of man’s consciousness of strength is in those who create the superman.

1061

The two most extreme ways of thinking, the mechanistic and the Platonic, are reconciled as ideals in the *eternal recurrence*.⁵⁰

1062

If the world had some purpose, this would have to have been achieved already. Were there some unintended final state in store for it, this too would have to have been achieved already. Were it at all capable of ‘being’, of remaining stationary or arriving at a steady state, if it had possessed this capacity for ‘being’ even if only for a moment in the course of its development, then all development would have long since come to an end, along with all thinking and all ‘intellect’. The fact that ‘intellect’ *develops* over time proves that the world has no purpose, no final state and is thus incapable of being. However, the old habit of thinking of things in the light of their purposes, of thinking of the world in terms of divine creation and guidance, is so powerful that the thinker has to be careful not to think that the world’s very failure to achieve any purpose is itself intentional. This idea – that the world intentionally *evades* achieving any purpose and even devises expedients to avoid falling into a cycle – inevitably occurs to all those who would like to insist upon the world’s *boundless capacity for innovation*, in other words, the finite, determinate energy of invariable magnitude that is ‘the world’ possesses the wondrous facility for *infinitely* reconfiguring its forms and states. The world is supposed to be capable of divine creative power, an infinite power of transformation, even if God no longer is; it is supposed to *prevent* itself of its own accord from falling back into one of its earlier

forms; it is supposed to have not only the intention, but also the *means* of *guarding* itself from any repetition; and thus at every moment it is supposed to *monitor* each of its movements to avoid achieving any purposes, arriving at any final states, or initiating any repetitions – and whatever else may follow from such inexcusably preposterous reasoning and wishful thinking. This is just the persistence of the earlier religious reasoning and wishful thinking, a kind of longing to believe that somewhere or other, in *some way or other*, the world is the same as the old, beloved, infinite and limitlessly creative God after all – that in some way or other ‘the old God still lives’ after all – that longing of Spinoza’s which expressed itself in the words ‘*deus sive natura*’ (he even experienced it in the form of ‘*natura sive deus*’). However, what proposition and belief provides the most definitive formulation of the decisive turning point, the present *ascendancy* of the spirit of science over the spirit of religion that creates fictitious gods? Is it not that the energy of the world may not be thought unlimited, because it is *unthinkable* – that we forbid ourselves the concept of an *infinite* energy *because it is incompatible with the concept ‘energy’*? From which it follows that the world lacks even the capacity for boundless innovation.

1063

The *eternal recurrence* is an inevitable consequence of the principle of the conservation of energy.

1064

The fact that a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is impossible. But in indeterminate space it would have to be reached, likewise in spherical space. The *form* of space must be the cause of perpetual movement and ultimately of all ‘imperfection’.

‘Force’, ‘rest’ and ‘self-identity’ are mutually exclusive. There is a fixed amount of force, but its essence is in flux, eliciting, constraining . . .

The notion ‘timelessness’ is to be rejected. Force cannot remain inert; at any given moment in which it operates, a new

distribution of forces is absolutely conditioned. 'Change' is essential to force, therefore so too is temporality. But this is just to say that change is subject to necessity, which is the same thought in a different guise.

1065

A certain emperor⁵¹ kept constantly before him the transitory nature of all things, so as not to attach too much *importance* to them and to remain tranquil in their midst. Conversely, to my mind it seems that everything is far too valuable to be so fleeting. I seek an eternity for everything – should the most precious salves and wines be poured into the sea? – and my consolation is that all that has been is eternal: the sea will wash it ashore again.

1066

*The new world-conception; the eternal
recurrence; philosophy*

- (1) The world exists; it neither becomes nor passes away.⁵² Or, rather, it becomes, it passes away, but it becomes without beginning and it passes away without end – it *subsists* in both . . . It lives on itself, it feeds on its excretions . . .
- (2) The hypothesis of a *created* world need not detain us for a moment. The notion 'creation' is today utterly indefinable and inapplicable, a mere word, a vestige of a superstitious age, and nothing is explained by words alone. A final attempt to conceive of a world that *began* has been recently made several times with the help of logical rigmarole – and in most of these cases, as one might imagine, the attempts were made with an ulterior theological motive.
- (3) Recently, people have tried several times to show that the notion of a world with an infinite *past* involves a contradiction;⁵³ these attempts even met with success, though at the price of mistaking the head for the tail. Nothing can prevent me from counting the moments gone by, beginning with the present and working backwards and saying: 'I shall never come to the end of them'; just as I can count the moments to come, starting from the present and

proceeding forwards to infinity. Only if I wanted to make the mistake – I shall take care not to do so – of equating this correct notion of a *regressus in infinitum* with the *entirely inapplicable* notion of an infinite *progressus up to* the present, despite the fact that the *direction* is a matter of complete indifference, would I take hold of the head of the present and think I hold the tail; I leave that to you, Herr Dühring! . . .

- (4) I have encountered this thought in five thinkers, and on every occasion I found that it was prompted by ulterior motives (mostly of a theological character, in favour of a *creator spiritus*). If the world could in any way ossify, wither away, perish, sink into *nothingness*; or if it could reach a state of equilibrium; or if it had an aim at all which would in itself entail permanence, immutability and a final condition (to put it in metaphysical terms, if becoming *could* pass over into being or nothingness), this state should have been reached. But it has not been reached, from which it follows . . . This is the only thing we can be certain of and which serves as a corrective to a great many world-hypotheses which are intrinsically possible. If, e.g., the mechanical interpretation cannot escape the conclusion that Thomson⁵⁴ has traced out for it, that the world will arrive at a final state, then the mechanical interpretation is thereby *refuted*.
- (5) If it is *possible* to think of the world as a determinate magnitude of force, as a determinate number of centres of force – and every other idea remains indeterminate and therefore *useless* – then it follows that it must go through a calculable number of combinations, in the great game of chance that is its existence. If an infinite amount of time has elapsed, then at some moment or other every possible combination must have been realized; and what is more, it would have been realized an infinite number of times. And since every other possible combination must have come and gone between each of these ‘combinations’ and its next ‘recurrence’, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same

series, a cycle of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated. The world is a cycle which has already been repeated an infinite number of times and plays its game *in infinitum*.

This conception is not simply mechanistic; for if it were, it would not require an infinite recurrence of identical cases, but a final state. It is *because* the world has not reached this final state that the mechanistic interpretation must be regarded as an imperfect and merely provisional hypothesis.

1067

And do you know what I take 'the world' to be? Shall I hold my mirror up to it? This world is a monster of energy, without beginning or end, a fixed and invariable magnitude of energy, no more, no less, which is never expended, merely transformed, of unalterable size as a whole, whose budget is without either expenses or losses, but likewise without gains or earnings, surrounded and bounded by 'nothingness'; it is nothing indefinite or dispersed, nothing infinitely extended, but rather a determinate amount of energy set in a determinate space and not a space which would be 'empty' anywhere, but on the contrary a space everywhere filled with energy, a play of energy and waves of energy, simultaneously the 'One' and the 'Many', waxing here and waning there, an ocean of tempestuous and torrential energies, forever changing, forever rolling back, with enormous periods of recurrence, with an ebb and flow of its configurations, bringing forth the most complicated from the simplest, the most fiery, fierce and self-contradictory from the most still, rigid and cold and then from this profusion returning again to simplicity, from this play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in the identity of its courses and ages, forever blessing itself as that which eternally recurs, a becoming which knows no satiety, disgust or weariness – this, my *Dionysian* world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction, this mysterious world with its two forms of voluptuousness, this my beyond good and evil, which has no aim if it does not lie in the happiness of the circle, which has no will, if a ring has no goodwill towards itself – do you

want a *name* for my world? A *solution* to all its enigmas? A *light* for you who are best concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most Northerly, most midnightly?⁵⁵ *This world is the will to power – and nothing besides!* And even you yourselves are this will to power – and nothing besides!